张新军

• 1:清华大学法学院

摘要(Abstract)：

“条约必须遵守”要求，主张条约失效、终止与停止施行，必须具备合法理由，并由主张者承担证明责任。这一合法性原则亦为1969年《维也纳条约法公约》所确认。关于《联合国宪章》第53条和第107条敌国条款因时间流逝而沦为“废文”的主张，主要依赖条约内嵌的终止机制和“过时”理论。然而，第53条和第107条既未规定终止期限，也未将敌国加入联合国设定为失效条件；权利放弃、敌国地位终止及措施违反强行规范等论点，既不足以证明相关条款的适用在法律上已不可能，从而构成“过时”,也难以脱离全体当事国同意而成为独立的条约终止依据。1995年联合国大会决议所表达的，仅是通过正式修正《联合国宪章》删除敌国条款的政治意愿，并不产生条款失效或终止的法律效果。因此，在法律层面，“废文论”缺乏充分的条约法基础，其形成主要源于特定国际法话语的持续建构；在政治层面，敌国条款的存废同样不应由时间流逝决定，而应取决于第二次世界大战后国际秩序所防范的根本威胁是否已经消除。

关键词(KeyWords)： 敌国条款;废文论;时间流逝;条约过时;条约终止

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 国家社科基金研究专项研究成果(编号：23VHQ002)

作者(Author): 张新军

参考文献(References)：

• (1)General Statement of the Conference of President Roosevelt,Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Churchill in North Africa (27 November 1943),Department of State Bulletin,Vol.IX:232,p.393 (Cairo Declaration);Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender (26 July 1945),in C.I.Bevans ed.,Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949,Vol.3:Multilateral Treaties 1931-1945,U.S.Government Printing Office,1969,p.1204 (Potsdam Proclamation).
• (2)Charter of the United Nations (signed 26 June 1945,entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI.
• (3)Ibid.,Art.53.
• (4)United Nations General Assembly Official Records,30th Session,Sixth Committee,1571st Meeting (21 November 1975),cited in Shigeru Oda & Hisashi Owada,Annual Review of Japanese Practice in International Law XIII (1974-1975),26 Japanese Annual of International Law 109 (1983).
• (5)Press Conference by Foreign Minister MOTEGI Toshimitsu,Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Nov.25,2025),https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/kaiken/kaikenite_000001_00077.html.
• (6)尽管各版相关条目的作者有所不同,但均维持了相同结论。Georg Ress (with Jürgen Brohmer),Article 53 (1) Clause 2 Phase 2 and Article 107,in Bruno Simma et al.eds.,The Charter of the United Nations:A Commentary,2nd ed.,Vol.I,Oxford University Press,2002,p.870-890 and 1330-1340;Georg Ress & Jürgen Brohmer,Article 53 (1) Clause 2 Phase 2 and Article 107,in Bruno Simma,Daniel-Erasmus Khan,Georg Nolte & Andreas Paulus eds.,The Charter of the United Nations:A Commentary,3rd ed.,Vol.II,Oxford University Press,2012,p.1506-1524,p.2183-2198;Couzigou,Article 53 and Article 107,in Bruno Simma,Daniel-Erasmus Khan,Georg Nolte & Andreas Paulus eds.,The Charter of the United Nations:A Commentary,4th ed.,Vol.II,Oxford University Press,2024,p.1909-1929,p.2835-2851.
• (7)Michael Wood,United Nations Charter,Enemy States Clauses,Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law,Oxford University Press,online ed.(Sept.2006),https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1713 print=pdf;Jean Allain,The True Challenge to the United Nations System of the Use of Force: The Failures of Kosovo and Iraq and the Emergence of the African Union,8 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 237,240 (2004);Yoram Dinstein,War,Aggression and Self-Defence,6th ed.,Cambridge University Press,2017,p.94,111;Robert Kolb,Article 53,in Jean-Pierre Cot,Alain Pellet & Mathias Forteau eds.,La Charte des Nations Unies:Commentaire article par article,3rd ed.,Vol.2,Economica,2005,p.1403,p.1414;Victor-Yves Ghébali,Article 107,in Jean-Pierre Cot,Alain Pellet & Mathias Forteau eds.,La Charte des Nations Unies:Commentaire article par article,3rd ed.,Vol.2,Economica,2005,p.2184,p.2188.
• (8)Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969),1155 UNTS 331,Art.26.
• (9)Ibid.,Preamble para.3.
• (10)Mark Eugen Villiger,Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2009,p.468.
• (11)Ian McTaggart Sinclair,The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,Manchester University Press/Oceana Publications,1973,p.86.
• (12)See Mark Eugen Villiger,supra note 10,p.545.
• (13)Ibid.
• (14)在条约的安全稳定方面,个别条款因时间流逝而被主张失效,还涉及条约规定能否分离的问题。《维约》第44条第1款规定,当事国废止、退出或停止施行条约的权利,原则上仅得对整个条约行使,除非条约另有规定或当事国另有协议。因此,敌国条款“废文论”若不能被归入条约内嵌的合意终止机制,而是主张“过时”可独立导致个别条款失效,仍可能面临可分离性障碍。
• (15)Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,Diplomatic Bluebook 2004,Chapter 3-A,https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2004/chap3-a.pdf,Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,Diplomatic Bluebook 2006,Chapter 10,https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2006/10.pdf.
• (16)截至2025年9月,联合国共有193个会员国,其中118个(包括中国、俄罗斯、日本和德国)为《维约》当事国。部分大国则并非当事国:美国和巴基斯坦虽已签署但尚未批准,法国和印度则未签署。See United Nations Treaty Collection,Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Status of Participants,accessed June.21,2026,https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?Temp=mtdsg3&chapter=23&clang=_en&mtdsg_no=xxiii-1&src=treaty.
• (17)Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,supra note 8,Art.5.
• (18)Ibid.,Art.4.
• (19)See Mark Eugen Villiger,supra note 10,p.110.
• (20)Ibid.,p.27.See also Kirsten Schmalenbach,Article 4,in Oliver D??rr & Kirsten Schmalenbach eds.,Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:A Commentary,2nd ed.,Springer,2018,p.91-92.
• (21)Sebastian von der Decken,Article 42: Validity and Continuance in Force of Treaties,in Oliver D??rr & Kirsten Schmalenbach eds.,Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:A Commentary,2nd ed.,Springer,2018,p.791.
• (22)Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,supra note 8,Art.42.
• (23)Kirsten Schmalenbach,supra note 20,p.92.
• (24)就敌国条款“废文论”的评价而言,这一点只有在“过时”本身构成一项独立的习惯国际法规,且未被《维约》关于条约无效、终止和停止施行事由的实体条款所编纂时,才具有关联性。具体讨论见后注[75]至[83]和相关正文。
• (25)除时间流逝外,理论上亦可依据《维约》第五编实体条款所反映的习惯国际法事由,主张敌国条款无效或终止。例如,《维约》第52条关于以威胁或使用武力缔结条约无效的规定,或可被提出作为依据。但该条以有关武力违反《宪章》所体现的国际法原则为前提,而敌国条款本身即为《宪章》的组成部分,难以同时被认定为违反《宪章》原则。
• (26)Winston Chew,The Doctrine of Implied Repeal by Desuetude: A Legal Anachronism or Viable Principle,5 Singapore Law Review 139 (1984).
• (27)Marcelo G.Kohen,Desuetude and Obsolescence of Treaties,in Enzo Cannizzaro ed.,The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention,Oxford University Press,2011,p.358.
• (28)Jan Wouters & Sten Verhoeven,Desuetudo,in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law,Oxford University Press,online ed.,2021-,accessed June 21,2026,https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1027.
• (29)International Law Commission,Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1966,Vol.II: Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session,United Nations,1966,p.237.
• (30)Marcelo G.Kohen,supra note 27,p.359.
• (31)Ibid.
• (32)例如,《维约》第55条规定,多边条约当事国数目减至条约生效所需数目以下,并不因此导致条约终止;第59条规定条约因缔结后订条约而默示终止或停止施行;第60条规定条约因违约而终止或停止施行;第61条规定发生意外不可能履行;第63条规定断绝外交或领事关系原则上不影响条约关系;第64条规定条约因与新产生的一般国际法强制规范(绝对法)相抵触而成为无效。
• (33)Daniel Costelloe,Treaty Succession in Annexed Territory,International & Comparative Law Quarterly,Vol.65:2,p.374-375 (2016);Thomas Giegerich,Article 62: Fundamental Change of Circumstances,in Oliver D??rr & Kirsten Schmalenbach eds.,Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:A Commentary,2nd ed.,Springer,2018,p.1146-1147,para.7;Malgosia Fitzmaurice,Exceptional Circumstances and Treaty Commitments,in Duncan B.Hollis ed.,The Oxford Guide to Treaties,Oxford University Press,2020,p.607.
• (34)情势变更原则的适用,以发生条约缔结时不能预见的情势为前提。然而,条约内嵌的时间流逝机制恰恰预设了敌国加入联合国这一情形。见后注[42]。
• (35)这一机制曾出现于草案第38条,其中使用了“modified by subsequent practice in the application of the treaty establishing the agreement of the parties to modify its provisions”的表述。参见International Law Commission,supra note 29,p.236;但《维约》最终未予纳入。关于嗣后实践以及嗣后形成的习惯国际法修正多边条约的问题,参见Irina Buga,The Impact of Subsequent Customary International Law on Treaties: Pushing the Boundaries of Interpretation?,Netherlands International Law Review,Vol.69,p.246-248,254 (2022)。
• (36)Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,supra note 8,Art.40 (1);See also International Law Commission,supra note 29,p.233.
• (37)Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,supra note 8,Art.42;Art.54.
• (38)Leland M.Goodrich & Edvard Hambro,Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents,World Peace Foundation,1946,p.289.
• (39)Georg Ress (with Jürgen Brohmer) (2002),supra note 6,p.871,para.39;Irène Couzigou (2024),supra note 6,p.1927,para.125.
• (40)在这一点上,该条与第107条形成对照;后者针对的是为处理敌国在第二次世界大战中实施侵略行为的后果而采取的行动。Irène Couzigou (2024),supra note 6,p.1909,para.78.
• (41)Georg Ress (with Jürgen Brohmer) (2002),supra note 6,p.876,para.54;Georg Ress & Jürgen Brohmer (2012),supra note 6,p.1513,para.94;Irène Couzigou (2024),supra note 6,p.1912,para.88(埃及关于将其作为过渡条款的建议未付诸表决)。
• (42)Schneider,Die Charta der Vereinten Nationen,p.169;Trützschler von Falkenstein,Die sich ??ndernde Bedeutung,p.20,cited in Irène Couzigou,supra note 6,p.1921,para.111.
• (43)《宪章》第78条规定:“凡领土已成为联合国之会员国者,不适用托管制度;联合国会员国间之关系,应基于尊重主权平等之原则。”Charter of the United Nations,supra note 2,Art.78.
• (44)International Law Commission,supra note 29,p.220.
• (45)凯尔森早在1946年即明确指出,从《宪章》文本来看,第107条并不因前敌国加入联合国而停止适用;第53条所称的“敌国”,在成为联合国会员国后仍属该条的适用对象。Hans Kelsen,Limitations on the Functions of the United Nations,Yale Law Journal,Vol.55:5,p.1015 (1946).
• (46)Marcelo G.Kohen,supra note 27,p.350,p.352.
• (47)Ibid.,p.358.
• (48)Jan Wouters and Sten Verhoeven,supra note 28.
• (49)相关论述参见Georg Ress (with Jürgen Brohmer) (2002),supra note 6,p.880-881,paras.66-67;Georg Ress & Jürgen Brohmer (2012),supra note 6,p.1520-1521,para.107;Irène Couzigou (2024),supra note 6,p.1918-1921,paras.104-110。
• (50)国际法院对放弃主权设定了严格标准。Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh,Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore),Judgment,ICJ Reports 2008,p.12,p.51,para.122 (“must be manifested clearly and without any doubt by that conduct and the relevant facts”).
• (51)相关论述参见Georg Ress (with Jürgen Brohmer) (2002),supra note 6,p.881,para.67;Georg Ress & Jürgen Brohmer (2012),supra note 6,p.1521,para.107;Irène Couzigou (2024),supra note 6,p.1918-1921,paras.104-110。
• (52)Norman Bentwich & Andrew Martin,A Commentary on the Charter of the United Nations,Routledge & Kegan Paul,1950,p.114.
• (53)日本政府曾主张,日本加入联合国意味着联合国已承认其为《宪章》第4条所称的“爱好和平之国家”,因此,日本与其他会员国之间的关系应适用主权平等原则。据此,将敌国条款解释为不再适用于日本,在逻辑上具有合理性。Minutes of the Second Subcommittee of the Budget Committee,House of Councillors,No.1,Apr.13,1970,p.22-23,cited in Shigeru Oda & Hisashi Owada,Annual Review of Japanese Practice in International Law IX (1970),Japanese Annual of International Law,Vol.19,p.163-164 (1975).
• (54)相关论述参见Georg Ress (with Jürgen Brohmer) (2002),supra note 6,p.879,para.65;p.1332,para.2;Georg Ress & Jürgen Brohmer (2012),supra note 6,p.1517,para.105;p.2186,para.2;Irène Couzigou (2024),supra note 6,p.1921,paras.110-111;p.2845,para.21。
• (55)Christian Tams,Article 5,in Bruno Simma,Daniel-Erasmus Khan,Georg Nolte & Andreas Paulus eds.,The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary,4th ed.,Oxford University Press,2024,p.531-532,paras.13-14.
• (56)Erika de Wet,Article 40,in Bruno Simma,Daniel-Erasmus Khan,Georg Nolte & Andreas Paulus eds.,The Charter of the United Nations:A Commentary,4th ed.,Oxford University Press,2024,p.1656-1657,paras.4-5.For relevant Security Council practice,see UN Security Council,Resolution 54 (1948),UN Doc.S/RES/54 (1948),15 July 1948;Resolution 62 (1948),UN Doc.S/RES/62 (1948),16 November 1948;Resolution 598 (1987),UN Doc.S/RES/598 (1987),20 July 1987;Resolution 660 (1990),UN Doc.S/RES/660 (1990),2 August 1990;Resolution 661 (1990),UN Doc.S/RES/661 (1990),6 August 1990;Resolution 678 (1990),UN Doc.S/RES/678 (1990),29 November 1990.
• (57)例如,《不扩散核武器条约》区分有核武器国家与无核武器国家,并分别规定不同的权利和义务,参见Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (opened for signature 1 July 1968,entered into force 5 March 1970) 729 UNTS 161 (NPT),Arts.I-III and IX (3);在气候变化领域,共同但有区别的责任原则亦允许不同缔约方承担不同义务,《京都议定书》即主要要求《联合国气候变化框架公约》附件一所列缔约方承担量化限制和减少排放承诺,参见Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 11 December 1997,entered into force 16 February 2005) 2303 UNTS 162 (Kyoto Protocol),Arts.3 (1) and 10,Annex B。
• (58)Case of the S.S.“Wimbledon”,Judgment,1923 P.C.I.J.Series A,No.1,p.25.
• (59)相关论述参见Georg Ress (with Jürgen Brohmer) (2002),supra note 6,p.872,para.42;p.884,para.79;Georg Ress & Jürgen Brohmer (2012),supra note 6,p.1507,para.82;Irène Couzigou (2024),supra note 6,p.1928,para.126。
• (60)Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,supra note 8,Art.35.
• (61)International Law Commission,supra note 29,p.227.
• (62)Ibid.
• (63)起草者考虑到《宪章》义务的优先地位可能使依据针对敌国的双边条约采取的措施受到限制,才一致同意纳入敌国条款,以确保有关措施不因《宪章》而失效或受到禁止。参见Irène Couzigou (2024),supra note 6,p.1912,para.88。
• (64)国际法委员会在《维约》草案评注中指出,《宪章》所规定的禁止使用武力原则本身就是具有强行法性质的国际法规则的一个显著例证。International Law Commission,supra note 29,p.248.国际法院在“尼加拉瓜案”中援引了上述评注,并指出当事双方均将禁止使用武力视为国际法的一项“根本性或核心性原则”。然而,法院仅确认了该原则的习惯国际法地位,并未自行将其明确界定为强行法。参见Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.United States of America),Merits,Judgment,I.C.J.Reports 1986,p.14,para.190。学说因此认为,法院在该段确认了禁止使用武力原则的习惯法地位,但谨慎地避免认定其具有jus cogens地位。参见Dinah Shelton,Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State Responsibility,96 American Journal of International Law 833,843 (2002);Claus Kre??,The International Court of Justice and the “Principle of Non-Use of Force”,in Marc Weller ed.,The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law,Oxford University Press,2015,p.571;Christian Henderson,The Use of Force and International Law,2nd ed.,Cambridge University Press,2024,p.39。
• (65)主张禁止使用武力原则具有jus cogens地位,参见Olivier Corten,The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in Contemporary International Law,2nd ed.,Hart Publishing,2021,p.206-216。反对其具有强行法地位的论述,参见James A.Green,Questioning the Peremptory Status of the Prohibition of the Use of Force,32 Michigan Journal of International Law 215 (2011)。相关争论亦参见Sondre Torp Helmersen,The Prohibition of the Use of Force as Jus Cogens: Explaining Apparent Derogations,61 Netherlands International Law Review 167,175-176 (2014);Katie A.Johnston,Identifying the Jus Cogens Norm in the Jus Ad Bellum,70 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 29 (2021)。
• (66)International Law Commission,supra note 29,p.248.
• (67)Georg Ress (with Jürgen Brohmer) (2002),supra note 6,p.875,para.52;Georg Ress & Jürgen Brohmer (2012),supra note 6,p.1512,para.92.
• (68)Georg Ress (with Jürgen Brohmer) (2002),supra note 6,p.870-871,para.38;Georg Ress & Jürgen Brohmer (2012),supra note 6,p.1506,para.78;Irène Couzigou (2024),supra note 6,p.1924,para.117.
• (69)International Law Commission,supra note 29,p.237.
• (70)Ibid.
• (71)Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,supra note 8,Art.54.
• (72)例如,在联合国处理1956年匈牙利事件时,苏联和匈牙利均未援引敌国条款对联合国的处理提出异议。Albano-Müller,Die Deutschland-Artikel in der Satzung der Vereinten Nationen,Kohlhammer,1967,p.69;R.Pernice,Die Sicherung des Weltfriedens durch regionale Organisationen und die Vereinten Nationen: Eine Untersuchung zur Kompetenzverteilung nach Kapitel VIII der UN-Charta,Hansischer Gildenverlag,1972,p.29.上述文献均转引自Georg Ress (with Jürgen Brohmer) (2002),supra note 6,p.879,para.65;Georg Ress & Jürgen Brohmer (2012),supra note 6,p.1518,para.105;Irène Couzigou (2024),supra note 6,p.1922,para.112。
• (73)International Law Commission,First Report on Unilateral Acts of States,Victor Rodríguez-Cedeňo,Special Rapporteur,UN Doc.A/CN.4/486,5 March 1998,p.9,para.35;See also Christopher C.Joyner,U.N.General Assembly Resolutions and International Law: Rethinking the Contemporary Dynamics of Norm-Creation,California Western International Law Journal,Vol.11:3,p.460-461 (1981).
• (74)相关论述参见Georg Ress (with Jürgen Brohmer) (2002),supra note 6,p.879-880,para.65;Georg Ress & Jürgen Brohmer (2012),supra note 6,p.1519,para.105。
• (75)Marcelo G.Kohen,supra note 27,p.359.
• (76)Jan Wouters and Sten Verhoeven,supra note 28.
• (77)Marcelo G.Kohen,supra note 27,p.358.
• (78)Ibid.,p.354.
• (79)Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,supra note 8,Art.42.
• (80)International Law Commission,supra note 29,p.237.
• (81)International Law Commission,supra note 29,p.236.
• (82)Sebastian von der Decken,supra note 21,p.799-801.
• (83)国际法委员会起草委员会于2025年二读通过的“一般法律原则”结论草案确认,一般法律原则除源自国内法律体系的原则外,还包括“可能在国际法律体系内形成的原则”[结论草案3(b)]。识别后一类原则时,有必要查明各国已承认该原则是国际法律体系固有的原则(结论草案7)。International Law Commission,General Principles of Law: Texts and Titles of the Draft Conclusions Adopted by the Drafting Committee on Second Reading,UN Doc.A/CN.4/L.1018,20 May 2025,draft conclusions 3 (b) and 7,https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/ltd/g25/079/71/pdf/g2507971.pdf.
• (84)参见United Nations General Assembly,Report of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization,UN Doc.A/50/33,1995,para.65;United Nations General Assembly,Resolution 50/52,UN Doc.A/RES/50/52,11 December 1995。
• (85)United Nations General Assembly,Resolution 50/52,UN Doc.A/RES/50/52,11 December 1995,preamble and para.3.
• (86)Charter of the United Nations,supra note 2,Art.108.
• (87)国际法委员会在嗣后实践修正条约的《维约》草案第38条评注中认为,嗣后实践本身无须由每一当事国积极参与,但必须足以证明全体当事国就有关修正达成合意。参见International Law Commission,supra note 29,p.236,Commentary to Draft Article 38,para.2。该草案条款最终未被《维约》纳入。
• (88)参见前注[36]和相关正文。
• (89)United Nations,Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs,Supplement No.10 (2000-2009),Vol.VI,Articles 108 and 109,para.12;Charter of the United Nations,supra note 2,Art.108;UNGA Res 50/52 (11 December 1995) UN Doc.A/RES/50/52,para.3.联大决议的一般拘束力并非《宪章》第108条所关注的核心问题。关于联大决议法律效果的一般讨论,see Marko Divac ??berg,The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ,16 European Journal of International Law 879,883-884 (2005)。
• (90)Andreas Kulick,About the Order of Cart and Horse,Among Other Things: Estoppel in the Jurisprudence of International Investment Arbitration Tribunals,27 European Journal of International Law 107,108 (2016).
• (91)参见前注[73]和相关正文。
• (92)Tomiichi Murayama,The Statement of Prime Minister Murayama on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the End of World War II,“The World and Japan” Database (Aug.15,1995),https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/docs/19950815.S1E.html.
• (93)村山谈话以第二次世界大战后五十周年首相正式谈话的形式,明确将日本作为殖民地统治和侵略的实施主体,并对此表达深刻反省和由衷歉意。这一表述延续了细川内阁此前的立场,并于2005年小泉谈话中再次得到确认。参见Koizumi,Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi,“The World and Japan” Database (Aug.15,2005),https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/JH/20050815.S1E.html。相比之下,日本众议院1995年6月9日通过的第二次世界大战后五十周年决议在提及近代史上的“殖民地统治和侵略行为”后,表示反省“我国过去实施的此类行为”。该决议文本并未像村山谈话那样直接表述为日本的“殖民地统治和侵略”。参见日本众议院:《歴史を教訓に平和への決意を新たにする決議》(1995年6月9日),第132届国会众议院本会议第35号,https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/113205254X03519950609/6。2005年8月2日通过的第二次世界大战后六十周年决议虽然重申对“我国过去一个时期的行为”给亚洲等国人民造成苦难的反省,却不再使用“侵略”和“殖民地统治”等用语。参见日本众议院:《国連創設及びわが国の終戦·被爆六十周年に当たり、更なる国際平和の構築への貢献を誓約する決議》(2005年8月2日),第162届国会众议院本会议第38号,https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/116205254X03820050802/6。
• (94)参见徐雨衡:《仇恨犯罪的刑法根基与犯罪预防》,载《比较法研究》2023年第1期,第85-86页;蔡桂生:《敌人刑法的思与辨》,载《中外法学》2010年第4期,第600-614页;刘仁文:《敌人刑法:一个初步的清理》,载《法律科学(西北政法学院学报)》2007年第6期,第54-59页。
• (95)笔者以布鲁诺·西马等主编《联合国宪章评注》2002年版、2012年版和2024年版中关于《宪章》第53条、第107条敌国条款的评注及脚注为统计对象,统计口径之一是“敌国条款已经过时”这一论点相关的学者著述。统计过程中,笔者于2026年6月25日使用OpenAI Codex辅助提取和归类引文,并对统计口径和统计结果逐项进行人工复核;Codex仅作为文本处理工具使用,并非本文事实来源或论证依据。有关学者著述的统计结果见表1。统计显示,相关论述资源主要集中于德国学者著述,并辅以日本学者及官方材料;德国学者代表包括W.Trützschler von Falkenstein、H.C.Schneider、D.Blumenwitz、C.Tomuschat、J.Hacker、Georg Ress、Bruno Simma等。
• (96)2024年版中,第53条和第107条敌国条款相关评注改由法国学者伊雷娜·库齐古(Irène Couzigou)撰写,相关内容结构和引文安排较2002年版、2012年版均有明显调整。该版大量引用库齐古本人的既有研究,从而稀释了德国学者著述在引文结构中的比重;但在与“废文论”相关的学者著述引证中,德国、日本学者仍占重要位置。统计结果见表1。
• (97)Michael Wood,supra note 7;Jean Allain,supra note 7;Yoram Dinstein,supra note 7;Robert Kolb,supra note 7;Ghébali,supra note 7.
• (98)例如,在布鲁诺·西马等主编的《联合国宪章评注》2024年版中,伊雷娜·库齐古撰写的《宪章》第53条第1款之二及第107条评注多次援引约拉姆·丁斯坦(Yoram Dinstein)著作,参见Irène Couzigou (2024),supra note 6,p.1926,para.123;p.1927,para.124;p.2842,paras.13-14。其对迈克尔·伍德(Michael Wood)所撰敌国条款词条的援引,参见同上注,p.1929,para.129;p.2848,para.27;对Jean-Pierre Cot,Alain Pellet & Mathias Forteau主编的La Charte des Nations Unies: Commentaire article par article,3rd ed.中罗伯特·科尔布(Robert Kolb)撰写的第53条评注及维克多-伊夫·盖巴利(Victor-Yves Ghébali)撰写的第107条评注的援引,参见同上注,p.1921,para.111;其中对盖巴利的再次援引,参见同上注,p.2848,para.27。
• (99)这表现在以下两个方面。其一,相关著作在讨论安理会依据《宪章》第八章授权区域安排使用武力时,往往不再论及同章第53条第1款之二的敌国条款。参见James Crawford,Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law,9th ed.,Oxford University Press,2019,p.741-742;Christine D.Gray,International Law and the Use of Force,3rd ed.,Oxford University Press,2008,p.417-426;Malcolm N.Shaw,International Law,8th ed.,Cambridge University Press,2017,p.975-980。其二,英文国际法总论教材在讨论《宪章》第2条第4款所规定的禁止使用武力原则及其现实例外时,通常集中于自卫和安理会授权,而不再将敌国条款作为仍具现实意义的例外加以讨论。参见Antonio Cassese,International Law,Oxford University Press,2001,p.305-320;Anthony Aust,Handbook of International Law,Cambridge University Press,2005,p.224-232;Vaughan Lowe,International Law,Oxford University Press,2007,p.271-275。